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I. 
PARTIES. 
This is an appeal from Orders entered by the United States District Court 
for the District of Utah denying Plaintiffs/Appellant's Motion To Alter Or Amend 
Judgment and for granting Defendant/Appellee Matthew Larson's Motion For 
Summary Judgment in a deadly force § 1983 civil rights suit based upon statute of 
limitations. Defendant/Appellee Larson is the sole defendant in this matter, he is 
responsible for illegally shooting Bertina Rae Olseth while she was in police 
custody. Olseth is the Plaintiff/Appellant. 
II. 
RECORD ON APPEAL. 
Olseth has filed an Appendix containing the District Court Docket, 
pleadings and other matters including a transcript of the hearing on Larson's 
Motion For Summary Judgment. The materials contained in that Appendix will be 
cited by referring to the name of the document followed by "App." and the page 
number of the Appendix on which the document may be found. Olseth has also 
included in her Brie/'an Addendum containing the Orders appealed from. The 
materials contained in the Addendum will be cited by referring to the name of the 
document followed by "Add." and the page number of the Addendum on which the 
document may be found. 
III. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION. 
This Court has jurisidiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2 (1953, as 
amended) ((1) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to answer questions 
of state law certified by a court of the United States. The U.S. Tenth Circuit 
Court of Appeals certified the question before this Court resulting from Olseth's 
appeal of her 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights action against a police officer who 
wrongful shot her several times from behind - excessive force claim. The U.S. 
District Court's jurisdiction was involved under 28 U.S.C. § 1343, 28 U.S.C. § 
1331, and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1988. Case law requires the U.S. District Court to 
"borrow" the appropriate statute of limitations because the Congress failed to 
establish one. 
IV. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES. 
Is the statute of limitations tolled under Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-35 when a 
person against whom a claim has accrued has left the state of Utah and has no 
agent within the state of Utah upon whom service of process can be made instead, 
but the person is amenable to service pursuant to Utah's long-arm statute, Utah 
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Code Ann. § 78-27-24? Answer is "yes" statute of limitations is tolled. Section 
78-27-24 only establishes in personam jurisdiction upon non-residents. Section 
78-12-35 concerns the tolling of subject matter jurisdiction while a Utah resident 
is absent from the state of Utah. 
V. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE. 
1. Plaintiff filed her first action in this matter on May 15, 2000 against 
Salt Lake City Corporation, Salt Lake City Police Department and various police 
officers of Salt Lake City, (Case No. 2:00-CV-0402C), including Larson. (App. 
53). That action alleged civil rights violations resulting from Plaintiffs arrest and 
injuries sustained when she was shot while commandeering a police vehicle on 
May 15, 1998. (App. 1-24, 30-37, 54). The only cause of action pled in her 
Complaint, relevant to this action, was for an alleged 42 U.S.C. § 1983 violation 
based on her allegation of unlawful use of deadly force. (App. 47). The only 
relief pled in her Complaint was for compensatory damages, prejudgment interest, 
and attorney's fees and costs. (App. 47). 
2. Plaintiffs first Complaint was dismissed by Judge Campbell on May 
15, 2002 for failure to prosecute. Plaintiff filed her second Complaint on October 
11, 2002 against the same parties, regarding the same facts and allegations, but 
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which sought to add new causes of action. The City moved for dismissal of all 
causes of action and parties. (App. 47). On June 6, 2003, the court granted in part 
the City's motion, allowing only the "loss of limb or member" cause of action to 
remain against the City. (App. 47). 
3. Upon the stipulation of the parties, Plaintiff amended her Complaint 
on September 17, 2003. (App. 25, 47). Plaintiffs Complaint named Matthew D. 
Larson as the Defendant in his individual capacity, and asserts a cause of action 
against him under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged violations of Plaintiff s 14th, 9th 
and 10th Amendment rights. (App. 47). 
4. In his Motion For Summary Judgment, Larson claimed he was never 
sued in his individual capacity until Plaintiff filed her second Complaint on 
October 11, 2002, more than four years after the incident complained of. He 
argued that because Olseth sued Larson^or the first time in his individual capacity 
beyond the general 4 year statute of limitations period her Complaint must be 
dismissed. (App. 31, 48). 
5. In opposition to summary judgment, Plaintiff asserted two defenses: 
(1) that Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-40 (1953, as amended) extends the statute of 
limitations by one year when a dismissal resulted in the first case's dismissal upon 
procedural grounds, and (2) due to Larson's absence from the State of Utah, the 
statute of limitations period was tolled under Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-35 (1953, 
as amended). (App. 59-60). 
6. Then in a surprising maneuver, at the hearing on oral arguments for 
summary judgment, Larson's counsel raised a new argument. Relying on Rodman 
and Lund, Larson asserted that Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-35 was not available as a 
defense to summary judment. Relying on these cases, it was proffered without any 
factual support, that Mr. Larson was amendable to service and therefore the statute 
of limitations had run. (App. 87, 89). 
7. Based upon the surprising argument, on March 2, 2004, the court 
granted summary judgment, but reserved for Plaintiff 10 days in which to move to 
alter or amend judgment, if desired. (App. 85, 101). 
8. Within 10 days, on March 9, 2004, Olseth filed her motion arguing 
that Section § 41-12a-505 did not control because that section applied only to 
nonresident motor vehicle accident cases, where the State Legislature created an 
agent and a procedure for personal service upon a nonresident driver through the 
Department of Commerce. Because an agent exists in the state of Utah in those 
situations, a nonresident motor vehicle operator defendant is amenable to service 
and therefore tolling under Section 78-12-35 is not available. (App. 108-112). 
9. Without any opposition by Larson, the Court denied the motion only 
claiming that Olseth failed to address the Rodman case. (App. 149-151). 
VII. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS. 
Judge Cassell was incorrect to deny the Motion To Alter Or Amend 
Judgment. (App. 149-153). The denial was plain error and an abuse of discretion 
in that he was opposite to the governing case law. Firstly, no evidence existed that 
Larson was ever amenable to service and it was undisputed that he was absent 
from the State of Utah. (App. 87). Secondly, The Motion To Alter Or Amend 
Judgment was unopposed by Larson-under local rule D.U.Civ.P. 7-1, default 
should have been entered. Finally, it is indisputable that the first lawsuit was 
dismissed on procedural grounds and that a filing against a police officer in his 
official capacity versus a lawsuit against him in his individual capacity are both 
procedural errors. (App. 47). Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-40 (1953, as 
amended), a second lawsuit can cure these types of errors contained in Olseth's 
first lawsuit. (App. 59-61). 
VIII. 
ARGUMENTS. 
POINT I. THE PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS WERE TOLLED DUE TO 
LARSON'S (A RESIDENT) ABSENCE FROM THE STATE. 
As this Court is well aware, Congress provided no specific statute of 
limitations for actions under the Civil Rights Acts. 42 U.S.C. 1988 endorses for 
the Civil Rights Acts the "settled practice" of adopting a state limitations period 
when the federal statute provides no such period, provided the state limitations 
period is not inconsistent with federal law or policy. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 
261, 266-67, 85 L. Ed. 2d 254, 105 S. Ct. 1938 (1985); see also Owens v. 
Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 239, 102 L. Ed. 2d 594, 109 S. Ct. 573 (1989). As the 
Supreme Court has acknowledged, section 1988 mandates a three-step procedure 
for selecting such a state limitations period: 
First, courts are to look to the laws of the United States "so far as such 
laws are suitable to carry [the civil and criminal civil rights statutes] into 
effect." If no suitable federal rule exists, courts undertake the second step 
by considering application of state "common law, as modified and changed 
by the constitution and statutes" of the forum state. A third step asserts the 
predominance of the federal interest: courts are to apply state law only if it 
is not "inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States." 
Burnett v. Grattan, 468 U.S. 42, 47-48, 82 L. Ed. 2d 36, 104 S. Ct. 2924 (1984) 
(citations omitted) (quoting 42 U.S.C. 1988); accord Wilson, 471 U.S. at 267. 
Since section 1983 indisputably contains no statute of limitations, the trial court 
must consider and apply the appropriate statute of limitations, subject to any 
tolling provisions available to these parties apply from the State of Utah, the state 
in which the Larson's shooting of Olseth occurred while she was in his custody. 
While section 1988 directs the trial court to borrow state limitations 
periods, it provides no guidance on how to select the appropriate one. 
Accordingly, the Supreme Court has told us to select the "most analogous" or 
"most appropriate" statute of limitations. Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 
U.S. 478, 485, 64 L. Ed. 2d 440, 100 S. Ct. 1790 (1980); Johnson v. Railway 
Express Agency, Inc., All U.S. 454, 462, 44 L. Ed. 2d 295, 95 S. Ct. 1716 
(1975). It must, of course, be "consistent with federal law and policy." Owens, 
488 U.S. at 239. 
Wilson dictates a three-part analysis to determine which state statute is most 
appropriate or analogous: 
We must first consider whether state law or federal law governs the 
characterization of a 1983 claim for statute of limitations purposes. If 
federal law applies, we must next decide whether all 1983 claims should be 
characterized in the same way, or whether they should be evaluated 
differently depending upon the varying factual circumstances and legal 
theories presented in each individual case. Finally, we must characterize 
the essence of the claim in the pending case, and decide which state statute 
provides the most appropriate limiting principle. 
Wilson, 471 U.S. at 268. 
Having answered the first question affirmatively — "the characterization of 1983 
[is] to be measured by federal rather than state standards" ~ the Wilson Court 
concluded that section 1988 directs the selection for each state of "the one most 
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appropriate statute of limitations for all 1983 claims." Id. at 270, 275. 
In this matter, Olseth argued to the trial court that Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-
40 (1953, as amended) was the most analogous provision applicable because this 
matter was the second lawsuit, after having the first matter being dismissed for 
procedural grounds. (App. 59-61, 85). Section 78-12-40 extends the statute of 
limitations for situations such as the one at hand. See McGuire v. University of 
Utah Medical Or., 603 P.2d 786 (Utah 1979). 
Meanwhile, Larson's proposition contradicts the obvious application of 78-
12-40 the application of Utah Code Ann. § 41-12a-505 (1953, as amended) it is 
clear from reading both Lund v. Hall, 938 P.2d 285 (Utah 1997) and Ankers v. 
Rodman, 995 F. Supp. 1329 (U. Dist. 1997) of which neither case if factually 
similar to the facts this matter-clearly the cases are distinguishable. (App. 85-93). 
Before the trial court, Plaintiff admitted the factual allegations contained in 
Larson's motion for summary judgment, but debated the argument that "Because 
[Olseth] sued Larson for the first time in his individual capacity beyond the statute 
of limitations period her Complaint must be dismissed." (App. 56). In disputing 
the claim, the plaintiff argued that the statute of limitations was (1) extended by 
Section 78-12-40 and (2) tolled by his absence from the state under Section 78-12-
35. It is indisputable that Larson now resides in Oklahoma, and as conceded by 
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counsel has since 2001. The effect of counsel's admission is that Olseth's claims 
have been tolled as against Larson. See Section 78-12-35. This section read: 
Where a cause of action accrues against a person when he is out of the state, 
the action may be commenced within the term as limited by this chapter 
after his return to the state. If after a cause of action accrues he departs from 
the state, the time of his absence is not part of the time limited for the 
commencement of the action. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-35 (2003). In this matter, the second sentence of 78-12-
35 is important to understand Olseth's position on appeal. 
In Utah, it is well recognized that the statute runs only during the time a 
debtor is openly in state, and immediately on his leaving it the statute again ceases 
to run until his return; in computing time all periods of absence must be 
considered and added together. Keith-O'Brien Co. v. Snyder, 51 Utah 227, 169 P. 
954 (1917). In this matter, although it is unclear to Olseth as to a particular date 
the defendant left the state of Utah, and it is uncertain whether he has ever 
returned, Olseth contends that Officer Larson has removed himself from the state 
for a couple of years prior to Judge Cassell's dismissal of the second lawsuit. 
Based upon information and belief Larson left the state for an FBI position in 
Oklahoma shortly following 01seth'sl999 trial.1 (App. 57). 
1
 Consequently, due to Officer Larson's absence from the State of Utah, Judge 
Cassell's ruling is technically voidable. When the City sought its dismissal of 
Plaintiffs malicious prosecution cause of action it fully was aware of the fact that 
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In defense to Ms. Olseth's claim, the Defendant, by proffer alone 
represented that Mr. Larson was amenable to personal service but offered no 
evidence to support the notion, only armed with the cases Lund and Rodman. 
(App. 89). That in court utterance is non-applicable misleading the court to 
dismiss. The statement was only a mere bald statement without any factual 
support. For Summary Judgment purposes, absent any supporting evidence that he 
is truly amenable to service or by what means actual service may be accomplished, 
summary judgment was to be applied in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. 
In Lund, the Utah Supreme Court in 1997 held that because the defendant 
was at all times amenable to service of legal process due to a true and lawful 
attorney's appointment, hence the tolling provision did not apply. In its reasoning, 
the Lund Court explained that the legislature had established substituted means of 
personal service in Section 41-12a-505. Lund case is unique because it was a 
motor vehicle accident involving a nonresident motorist. In Olseth's situation, 
this matter is entirely distinguishable from Lund. In this matter, the defendant was 
a Utah resident, and then subsequently absent himself from the State of Utah. 
Larson had left the State tolling that issue. This Court through a material act was 
misled to rule against Olseth. Meanwhile, this Court should remand this matter for 
further determination as to when Larson left the State and if ever, returned to the 
State. The record of devoid of any evidence to support the proposition that Larson 
was ever amenable to service. 
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Because he relocated himself and his family, noone remained to accept service. 
The means of service of process in Lund was statutorily set forth in Utah's 
Nonresident Motor Vehicle Act. That act specifically sets forth a means of service 
of process for nonresidents involved in a motor vehicle accident. The Act 
appoints the Division of Corporations and Commercial Code as the true and 
lawful attorney of legal process within the State of Utah for the purpose of 
accomplishing service. Due to the existence of a legal representative, tolling was 
not an issue and cannot be an issue in an accident involving a motor vehicle 
accident of a nonresident. In contrast, Mr. Larson, clearly a Utah resident at the 
time he breached his duty to protect his prisoner when he shot Olseth several times 
from behind for doing nothing more than embarrassing him after he arrested her, 
had no attorney in fact, statutory appointed alternate means of personal service, or 
an authorized agent to accept personal service on his behalf. The record in this 
case shows that when specifically requested, the City attorney's office refused to 
accept service at ever juncture. (App. 90). 
Later on, after committing perjury during Olseth's State criminal 
proceedings, the record reflects that Larson undeniably left the state of Utah in 
2001. It's important to understand Olseth was acquitted of the aggravated assault 
charge Larson falsely accused Olseth of committing. Moreover, its important to 
12 
know that the City and Mr. Larson wrongfully concealed exculpatory evidence 
from Olseth and her defense counsel during that criminal trial. (App. 118-121). 
The material information contained in these exhibits was never mentioned at trial 
despite cross-examination. 
Upon his absence, Larson was no longer amenable to personal service in the 
State of Utah, at all. Even though, Larson's counsel merely argued that Larson 
was amenable to personal service, the trial court accepted that statement alone and 
then dismissed Olseth's final claim by granting summary judgment for statute of 
limitations. (App. 87, 98). There is no factual record to back the statement up. 
The Nonresident Motor Vehicle Act does not apply to this matter. No other 
statutes excludes Larson in his situation, not even Utah's Long Arm Statute, 78-
27-24. Unlike the Nonresident Motor Vehicle Act, the Long-Arm Jurisdiction Act 
does not provide a substitute method of accomplishing service of process in the 
State of Utah. This Court in the case Burt Drilling, Inc. v. Portadrill, 608 P.2d 
244 (1980) addresses the purpose of Section 78-27-24. In it, this Court held that 
Section 78-27-24 created in personam jurisdiction over individuals not within the 
state of Utah and required them to fulfill the two-part test to establish "minimal 
contacts." Minimal contacts was not the issue here, nor was the issue that Larson 
was a nonresident. At all times relevant to the suit, Larson was a resident and had 
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since absent himself from the State of Utah. Therefore, tolling was the only 
appropriate argument the court should have accepted pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-12-35. It's important to recall that it is the moving party's responsibility to 
demonstrate through supporting evidence how was he amenable to service by 
actual presence within the State or that the appointment of a true and lawful 
attorney existed to actually defeat Olseth's tolling argument. Once Larson no 
longer maintained his residency in Utah, and he and his family left the State, 
Larson no longer had a legal representative. Section 41-12a-505, appoints "a true 
and lawful attorney." In this matter, no such true and lawful attorney is or 
admittedly was established clear until 2003, when Mr. J. Wesley Robinson final 
accepted service after repeated attempts. In the former Tena Campbell action, The 
City refused to act as Mr. Larson's true attorney. As a matter of fact, as Mr. 
Robinson admitted in this proceeding, the former action was one in Mr. Larson's 
official capacity or against the City in other words. Well even in that matter, the 
City required personal service upon him anyhow when Olseth served only the City 
originally. The City and Larson cannot reap the benefits of having it both ways. 
Equitable tolling doctrines were created to protect injured parties from mischief. 
Once the true circumstances of Mr. Larson's residency was discovered, the fair 
answer from this Court should be that upon discovery that Larson was no longer 
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available for process of service within the state of Utah, under the discovery 
doctrine, Olseth should have one year to effect proper service. This ruling fairly 
provides adequate due process protection for all interested parties, including these 
litigants, the Federal Court system, and Utah citizens and its visitors alike. This 
appears to be a case of first impression, therefore there is no cited caselaw. 
As for the Rodman case, Rodman is nothing more than persuasive authority 
and in this matter is not even that. Rodman's situation is unique to the case at 
hand. Ankers v. Rodman, 995 F. Supp. 1329 (U. Dist. 1997), the district court 
judge, David Sam dismissed Ankers' civil action be in his opinion the matter was 
time-barred. Judge Sam was correct in this matter because that action was a 
diversity claim filed in Federal Court because Dennis Rodman had assaulted 
Lavon Ankers during a Utah Jazz versus San Antonio Spurs NBA basketball 
game. Ms. Ankers, who was an usher in the Delta Center was in her assigned 
position in the arena near the court. At one point during the fourth quarter of play, 
Mr. Rodman pinched Ms. Ankers on the buttocks. She sued Rodman for battery 
and intentional infliction of emotional distress nearly two years after the incident. 
In Utah, these types of claims must be filed within one year of the incident. 
Plaintiff argued tolling under section 78-12-35. Appropriately tolling was not 
available under that situation because the defendant Rodman was not a Utah 
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resident. Clearly Mr. Rodman never was a Utah citizen and Ankers knew that or 
reasonably should have known that he was not given the Antonio Spurs namesake. 
Unlike Mr. Rodman, Larson in this matter was a Utah resident, however. Until it 
was discovered Larson was no longer a Utah resident, that period should be tolled 
for her protection. 
Judge Cassell was plainly wrong for granting summary judgment. Under 
either theory, sections 78-12-40 or 78-12-35, the statute of limitations was not an 
issue. Because of the dismissal by Judge Campbell in the first lawsuit section 78-
12-40 extended the statute of limitations period by a year. Because Larson absent 
himself from the state in 2001, the statute of limitations period was tolled from 
2001 for the time thereafter. 
POINT II. NO EVIDENCE OF LARSON'S ALLEGED AMENABILITY TO 
SERVICE WAS EVER DEMONSTRATED-MOREOVER NO RECORD 
EXISTS OF AMENABILITY TO SERVICE. 
On summary judgment, the standard of practice is well-settled in this circuit 
and Utah, taking our direction from the Supreme Court. The Court in Celotex 
Corp. v. Catrett, All U.S. 317, 322-23, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265, 106 S. Ct. 2548 (1986) 
has dictated that the burden of persuasion is first on the moving party and the court 
must construe the facts before it in light most favorable to the moving party. In 
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this case, this standard was not followed. In this matter, the Court accepted the 
time-bar claim simply on the proffer by counsel that Larson was amenable to 
service. Larson's counsel provided no evidence to the record to demonstrate that 
Larson was ever amenable to personal service. (App. 87). Quite to the contrary, 
the record demonstrated that Larson was never amenable to service. (App. 106-
148, 82-103). In both actions, the first lawsuit, the City Attorney's Office 
specifically required Plaintiff to effectuate personal service upon Larson even 
though the complaint erroneously pled against Larson in his official capacity. 
Because of his personal service, he cannot later argue no notice-he has his 
attorneys to thank for that. Later, after the first lawsuit was dismissed by Judge 
Campbell for failure to prosecute, and since Larson was no longer in the state of 
Utah, the City Attorney's Office refused to accept service claiming (1) not to be 
his attorney, and (2) not have any contact with him.2 (App. 111). 
In this matter, because the clear weight of the evidence shows that Mr. 
Larson had left the state of Utah, the district court plainly should have applied 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-35. Again this section reads: 
Where a cause of action accrues against a person when he is out of the state, 
the action may be commenced within the term as limited by this chapter 
2
 At no time was it revealed to Olseth though that Larson had left the state to 
join the FBI in Oklahoma. 
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after his return to the state. If after a cause of action accrues he departs from 
the state, the time of his absence is not part of the time limited for the 
commencement of the action. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-35 (2003). Lund's parent case, Snyder v. Clune, 15 Utah 
2d 254, 390 P.2d 915 (Utah 1964), first ruled on the nonresident motor vehicle 
issue. Snyder, assists us in the understanding the application of 78-12-35. Justice 
Crockett conceded that on a superficial look 78-12-35 could apply but then 
reasoned against it applying the nonresident motor vehicle act, declaring, "The 
effect of [the nonresident motor vehicle act established in 1948] is to constitute the 
Secretary of State as the agent of a nonresident motorist to receive process for [the 
defendant]. Further pertinent to this problem is Rule 4(e) (1) U.R.C.P., which 
states that personal service may be made upon a defendant '* * * by delivering a 
copy to an agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of 
process.'" Id., 15 Utah 2d 256. (Emphasis added.) 
These decisions, both Lund and Snyder do not disturb the well-settled case 
of Keith-O'Brien Co. v. Snyder, 51 Utah 227, 169 P. 954 (1917) concerning 
section 78-12-35. The Keith-O'Brien, Court held that absence from the state tolls 
the statute, [] that the statute runs only during the time the debtor is openly in the 
state and immediately on his leaving it the statute against ceases to run until his 
return, and that in computing time all the periods of absence must be considered 
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and added together. 
CONCLUSION 
The district court used Lund and Rodman without factual support to 
conclude that the statute of limitations had expired. The court granted summary 
judgment against Olseth's § 1983 claim for wrongful use of deadly force believing 
that the claim was time-barred because Larson was amenable to personal service. 
But clearly the Nonresident Motor Vehicle Act and Rodman's Texas residency are 
the reasons neither case controls the outcome of this matter. Under either Sections 
78-12-35, 78-12-40, or both, summary judgment never should have been granted. 
Under the points argued above, and the governing statutes, case law, and court 
rules cited, summary judgment should be reversed and the matter should be 
remanded for trial. In the alternative, the district court should take evidence 
concerning the City's amenable for service claim-and service by publication is not 
acceptable as an answer from the defendant or we may find ourselves back on 
appeal. It is a form of reliable personal service such as what the Nonresident 
Motor Vehicle Act provides that is the appropriate answer. 
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ORAL ARGUMENTS REQUESTED. 
In this matter, Olseth hereby requests oral arguments because the facts and 
history of the case is significant and are extremely detailed. Olseth believes that 
once the details are clearly understood, a ruling in her favor is imminent. Because 
of Larson's ambush at the hearing on oral arguments, it is understandable why the 
trial court mistakenly accepted Larson's counsel's argument of amenability to 
personal service. Once the judge made his mind however, he was unwilling to 
alter his judgment even when Olseth's motion to alter or amend judgment was 
unopposed. Olseth requests oral arguments to give this court an opportunity to 
answer questions that may arise among panel members through a review of the 
briefs in this matter. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 21st day of April, 2006. 
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